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TO ALL  
MILITARY SOULS  
OF THE  
English NATION 
Tis for your Perusal that this Treatise is publish’d… if the English 
Courage alone, without the Assistance of Art, hath been so Victorious, 
what Wonders would it not be able to perform, if it were seconded by 
Policy and Craft? I conceive therefore it may not be useless to you, my 
Brave Countrymen, to have an Abstract, or a Collection in your own 
Language of the Stratagems which have been practiced in War by the 
most experienced Commanders… For that purpose I have Translated 
FRONTINUS, who, being a ROMAN Warriour, and of the Order of the 
Consuls, Collected the most remarkable Stratagems of the PERSIANS, 
GREEKS, ROMANS and CARTHAGINIANS. 
Marius d’Assigny, The Stratagems of War, or, A collection of the most 
celebrated practices and wise sayings of the great generals in former 
ages written by Sextus Julius Frontinus, one of the Roman consuls; 
now English’d 
 
For more than sixteen centuries, from the late first century AD down to the end of the 
renaissance and beyond, Frontinus was regularly referred to as an expert and authority 
on military matters. The twelfth-century scholar John of Salisbury, for instance, drew 
on Frontinus’ writing as much as he did on the works of Virgil, Plato and a host of 
other classical authors in his formulation of a new political philosophy in the 
Policraticus.2 Excerpts of Frontinus’ Strategemata turn up in mediaeval crusading 
manuals, such as Marino Sanudo Torsello’s Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the 
Cross. In 1417 one Jean Gerson, tutor to the then Dauphin of France, lists the 
Strategemata alongside the Bible, other Christian texts, and works by Aristotle, 
Sallust, Livy, Valerius Maximus, Seneca, Vegetius and Augustine (inter alia), as a 
kind of literary ‘Ark of the Covenant’ that the young prince should absorb and carry 
metaphorically about with him ‘through the desert of this world’.3 Christine de Pizan 
(a scholar well known to Gerson, who also proffered advice to those in power in 
fourteenth- and fifteenth-century France) quotes extensively from the Strategemata 
throughout the second part of her Book of Deeds of Arms and Chivalry.4 Although 
Machiavelli never mentions Frontinus by name, he too seems to have borrowed from 
the Strategemata in more than one of his works.5 And translations of the text 
abounded across Europe, including one addressed to Henry VIII, which promised to 
                                                
1 I am grateful to The Leverhulme Trust for the Research Fellowship during which 
this article was written; also to Jason König, for his incisive feedback and advice. 
2 Martin 1997; cf. Nederman 1990: xx.  
3 Gerson, Au précepteur du Dauphin, Constance, vers Juin 1417 (Glorieux 1960: 203-
15; cf. Thomas 1930: 30-55, who dates the letter rather to 1408-10; also Mazour-
Matusevich & Bejczy 2007).  
4 Willard 1995; Forhan 2002: 150-7; le Saux 2004. 
5 In particular, in his Art of War (Lynch 2003: xiv-xv); see also Wood 1967, on the 
possibility that Frontinus’ Strategemata influenced Machiavelli’s didactic method in 
his Discourses on Livy. 
support that ‘moste high, excellente, and myghtye Prynce’ by inspiring and 
instructing his military captains (who ‘have oft declared that they lytell nede any 
instructions, any bokes’), just as the Strategemata claimed to inspire and instruct its 
original readers.6 
 This chapter is about the models of authority and expertise that the 
Strategemata itself projects and prompts reflection on. But it is instructive to begin by 
looking at what it was about the text (and its author) that prompted later readers to 
deem it authoritative; not only because some of them continue to shape our 
approaches to the Strategemata today, but also because the differences between their 
responses to it point up some fascinating contradictions and tensions within the 
treatise – tensions which are revealing of the challenges and opportunities that many 
scientific/technical/didactic authors have wrestled with in constructing and parading 
authority and expertise, especially in the military sphere. 
It was arguably Vegetius, writing in the late fourth- or early fifth-century AD, 
who cemented Frontinus’ status as an authority on military matters by citing him as 
one of his most important sources (at Epitome 1.8 and 2.3).7 Vegetius builds his own 
authority and expertise on scholarly foundations, and presents himself as writing 
within an established and important literary tradition: one (he claims) that had begun 
in ancient Greece but had been honed and was now dominated by Roman writers, 
who had helped to transform military practice into a scientific discipline.8 Cato the 
Elder is identified not just as an early example but as a forthright champion of this 
tradition:  
‘Cato, because he was invincible in battle and had often led the army as 
consul, believed that he could benefit the republic further by setting down 
in writing his military learning. For things that are done bravely last one 
generation; but things that are written down for the genuine benefit of the 
republic last forever.’ (Epitome 2.3)  
Frontinus is then singled out as following in Cato’s footsteps: ‘Several others did the 
same, but in particular Frontinus, whose industry in this regard was approved by 
Trajan.’ Frontinus, like Cato, had not just written about soldiering but had seen plenty 
of military service himself; he had also served as consul no fewer than three times, 
and was doubtless ‘approved’ by Trajan far more for the role he played in securing 
Nerva’s adoption of Trajan as his heir than for anything that he wrote.9 Nonetheless, 
Vegetius’ overriding interest in the written word leads him to suggest that what makes 
Frontinus a significant figure in military history (someone worth citing and 
connecting oneself with) is his literary activity, not his practical experience. For 
Vegetius, Frontinus is authoritative (and was so for his contemporaries) above all 
because he was a Roman author writing in (and able to link Vegetius to) a long line of 
earlier authors who together had refined and disciplined military knowledge.  
Aelianus Tacticus, writing much closer in time to Frontinus but from a Greek 
perspective, offers a different analysis. The prologue to his Tactical Theory stages a 
stand-off between Greek military ‘science’ (mathema and theoria) and contemporary 
Roman military practice (dunamis and empeiria). Inspired by the former but 
                                                
6 Morysine 1593. 
7 On the relationship between Vegetius and Frontinus’ survival, see esp. Allmand 
2009; also Allmand 2011: 48-61; Lenoir 1996: 81. 
8 See esp. the prologues to Books 1 and 3 and 1.8, where the act of writing is 
associated with the development of military knowledge; also Formisano in this 
volume on the authority of literature/writing (as opposed to practical experience) in 
Vegetius’ Epitome and other military manuals; and Formisano 2009: 333-5 on 
Vegetius’ role in making the ‘art of war’ a fundamentally literary phenomenon.  
9 On Frontinus’ career: Eck 1982: 47-52; Rodgers 2004: 1-5. 
(supposedly) daunted by the momentum of the latter (which was achieving 
unparalleled successes under the aegis of Aelian’s dedicatee, Trajan), Aelian claims 
that he initially hesitated to write about ‘a science forgotten and moreover long out of 
use since the introduction of the [Roman] system’;10 until, that is, an encounter with 
Frontinus, whose own interest in Greek military theory encouraged Aelian to proceed: 
‘...I was able to spend some days at Formiae with the distinguished 
consular Frontinus, a man of great reputation by virtue of his experience 
(empeiria) in war. Discovering in conversation with him that he had no 
lesser regard for Greek tactical science, I began not to despise their 
tactical writing, thinking that Frontinus would not pay so much attention 
to it if he indeed considered Roman tactical usage superior.’ (Tact. pr. 3) 
Later on (Tact. 1.2), Aelian identifies Frontinus explicitly as an author (as he asserts 
the literary and scholarly foundations of his own expertise). Indeed, Frontinus stands 
out as the only Roman in a list of notable military writers whose works Aelian has 
read; and it is possible that the very format of his Tactical Theory was influenced by 
the Strategemata.11 It is significant, however, that in the story of their meeting it is 
Frontinus’ consular status and his practical experience that Aelian chooses to 
highlight. His literary activities are implicit in the background, but the hands-on 
connotation of the word empeiria identifies Frontinus’ campaigns in Britain and 
elsewhere as the foundation of his authority and expertise and the main reason why 
his views on military matters (and Aelian’s literary project) might carry some weight. 
Frontinus’ endorsement of Aelian’s Tactical Theory is not authoritative because he is 
a leading light in a long scholarly tradition. Indeed, as flattering as his inclusion in 
that list of Aelian’s sources might look, it serves primarily to point up the 
overwhelming dominance of Greek learning on the subject and to undermine Rome’s 
contribution.12 Rather, Frontinus’ supposed support of Aelian is meaningful because 
of his political prominence and connections; and also (especially) because Frontinus 
can serve as an embodiment of the contemporary Roman military practice/prowess 
that Aelian’s Greek ‘science’ is trying to compete with.  
 In the preface to his edition of the Strategemata quoted above, Marius 
d’Assigny identifies Frontinus both as an author (whose text has much to teach the 
valiant English about the ‘art’ of war) and as a ‘warrior’ and consul. He is ROMAN, 
and the authority of the Classical past is one of the things that makes him worth 
reading; d’Assigny, like Vegetius, turns to Frontinus in part because he hails from the 
height of the Roman empire. But it is also the access that he gives to other historical 
figures, PERSIANS, GREEKS, ROMANS and CARTHAGINIANS, that attracts 
d’Assigny. For him, the authority of the Strategemata lies as much, if not more, in the 
expertise of the ‘experienced commanders’ whose ‘remarkable stratagems’ Frontinus 
has collated. The author’s scholarly, political and military credentials count for 
something; but readers will learn even more from the characters who inhabit the text 
and whose deeds Frontinus (and now d’Assigny) has helped to immortalise. Indeed, 
they will learn from others too: for d’Assigny appends to his translation of the 
Strategemata ‘A Collection of the Brave Exploits and Subtil Stratagems of several 
famous Generals since the Roman Empire’ and, to follow that, ‘A Discourse of 
Engines used in War’. Like de Pizan, among others, he not only ‘Englishes’ 
FRONTINUS, in other words; he updates him, leaning on his various layers of 
                                                
10 This and the following translation are from Devine 1989. 
11 For instance, commentators often see Aelian’s use of sub-headings as his own 
innovation (Devine 1989: 32; Stadter 1978: 118), but he may have been copying 
Frontinus in this. 
12 In fact Frontinus is characterised there (somewhat unjustly) as a commentator on 
other writers, not a theorist in his own right. 
authority to generate some of his own, but also alerting us to its limits – to the fact 
that Frontinus (like d’Assigny himself) does not have a monopoly on military know-
how but is one step in an on-going process of pooling and re-circulating many 
people’s (different forms of) expertise.  
 The story of the Strategemata’s reception is much longer and wider-ranging 
than that; but these three episodes offer a taste of the variety of responses to and uses 
made of the text by later readers. Between them (and this is why they were chosen) 
they also expose the multiplicity of axes along which authority and expertise are 
constructed – or at least explored – in the Strategemata itself. For as this chapter will 
show, textual and scholarly authority share the stage with hands-on experience and 
the native wisdom of men from days gone by. That combination is not uncommon; 
indeed, it is evident in several of the other texts discussed in this volume. However, 
this chapter will argue that in Frontinus’ Strategemata scholarly learning and practical 




TEXTUAL AUTHORITY AND ‘SCIENTIFIC’ EXPERTISE 
 
The first kind of authority that Frontinus lays claims to at the start of the Strategemata 
is of the scholarly, textual, ‘scientific’ variety. By way of introduction, he reminds us 
of the existence of his (now lost) De Re Militari, which (he claims) is what inspired 
the present text: 
 ‘Since I, alone amongst those studying it, have attempted to draw up 
(instruendam) a science (scientia) of military matters, and since I seem to 
have achieved my objective, as far as my efforts could manage, I feel that 
the project I have begun still requires me to collect together in a 
serviceable handbook (expeditis amplectar commentariis) the clever deeds 
of generals (sollertia ducum facta) which the Greeks have gathered 
together under the one name ‘strategemata’. 
His industry, which borders on perfectionism, is impressive, but on its own does not 
render him particularly authoritative.13 More significant is the systematisation of 
material implicit in his use of instruo and scientia: for these set Frontinus up not 
merely as a conveyor but as a refiner of knowledge, a theorist even. In addition, his 
suggestion that he is one of the first to discipline military know-how thus (despite 
being a stock and highly debatable claim) stamps his mastery over it yet more 
forcefully.14 By dint of his earlier writing, and the proclaimed originality of the 
‘scientific’ approach that underpins it (which itself taps into a wider trend of 
systematisation of knowledge that had long been associated with authority and 
expertise), Frontinus figures at the start of the Strategemata as a – if not the – 
contemporary expert on military matters.  
 In alerting us to his own achievements as an author, he also positions himself 
vis-à-vis other literary and scholarly authorities. His use of Greek terminology to 
explain what he means by sollertia ducum facta, for instance, invokes a strand of the 
Greek military writing tradition and identifies the Strategemata as a descendent of 
it.15 But it perhaps also invokes a Roman tradition too, that of supplanting Greek 
                                                
13 Although, as Wietzke in this volume argues, industry itself – particularly in a work 
that could be said to benefit the community (Strat. 1 pr.3) – confers a degree of social 
authority on the author. 
14 Wheeler 1988: 19-20; Santini 1992: 984-5; Lenoir 1996: 82. 
15 Cf. Valerius Maximus 7.4, whose suggestion that there is no equivalent Latin term 
for strategemata also implies that ‘stratagems’ (or at least writing about them) are 
models with new Roman equivalents. Frontinus’ sentence structure here surrounds the 
Greek military writing tradition (quae a Graecis una στρατηγηάµτων appellatione 
comprehensa sunt) with his (very Roman) new version of it (sollertia ducum facta… 
expeditis amplectar commentariis16), hinting – not least through the suggestive 
military metaphors lurking in expeditis and amplectar – at the possibility that he is not 
merely adopting a Greek model but besieging and taking it over. 
 The historiographic tradition is another co-ordinate that Frontinus uses to 
characterise his Strategemata and assert its authority. He points out overlaps (from 
which his own text derives some associated validity and status): instructive exempla 
can be found in many historical texts. Indeed, much of the material in his treatise has 
already been recorded elsewhere:  
‘I neither ignore nor deny the fact that in the course of their works 
historians have also included this feature, and that all significant examples 
have already been set down by writers in one way or another (et ab 
auctoribus exemplorum quidquid insigne aliquot modo fuit traditum).’ 
(Strat. 1, pr. 2) 
The juxtaposition here of ab auctoribus and exemplorum indicates that as well as 
historians Frontinus is keen to connect his work with a specific off-shoot of 
historiography, the exempla tradition. In fact, an observant reader will notice that 
what he goes on to say – about what distinguishes his Strategemata from these other 
texts – invites particular comparison with Rome’s most famous exponent of that genre, 
Valerius Maximus. For, when Frontinus claims that his Strategemata will spare 
readers the tedious task of sifting through the vast body of historical writing to look 
for scattered examples themselves, he is echoing Valerius Maximus’ own prefatory 
remarks.17 Frontinus goes on to assert the Strategemata’s superiority over even 
Valerius’ kind of writing, however; for he argues that authors of exempla collections, 
no less than historians, still ‘confound’ the reader with the volume of their material, 
despite the fact that they are in the business of excerpting from histories (‘those, too, 
who have made selections of notable examples have overwhelmed the reader with, as 
it were, a great heap of information.’). He thus highlights links between his treatise 
and other well-established genres, and derives some associated authority from them 
(and the overlaps that he points to between his writing, historiography, and so on, 
serve as a useful reminder that distinctions between ‘technical’ and other kinds of 
text/genre were not nearly so clear-cut in antiquity as many studies suggest). However, 
he also claims to stand out from them, to offer his readers something different.  
 Systematisation comes to the fore again as Frontinus explains what it is that 
sets his Strategemata apart. Rather than far-flung anecdotes or an overwhelming mass 
of material (the imagery here makes quite an impression), he promises a collection of 
examples that has been organised, fittingly, with military precision: 
‘My effort centres around the challenge of setting out precisely whichever 
example is required, in any given circumstance, as if in response to 
questions. For, having surveyed the categories, I have prepared a set of 
suitable examples as one might prepare a plan of campaign. Moreover, so 
that they might be divided up and organised according to the variety of 
their subject-matter, I have separated them into three different books: in 
the first are examples that relate to pre-battle activities; in the second, 
those that pertain to the battle itself and to the resolution of conflict; the 
                                                                                                                                      
originally a Greek tradition; also Wheeler 1988: 25-49 on the Greek history of the 
genre. 
16 The commentarius is a particularly Latin genre, of course. 
17 Comments that Frontinus makes later in the preface (Strat.1.pr.3) on the theme of 
not being exhaustive are also reminiscent of Valerius Maximus’ preface. 
third will contain ‘stratagems’ for the formation and breaking of sieges.’ 
(Strat. 1, pr. 2) 
The very military-ness of this layout and Frontinus’ authorial approach lends both text 
and writer an air of martial expertise; indeed, the military metaphors that he uses to 
describe the Strategemata’s organisation perhaps hint at his personal talent for or 
experience of command. But (as in the case of the De Re Militari) it is also the text’s 
methodical discipline, the systematic nature of its composition, that generates 
authority – a feature which subsequent prefaces flag up, and which is reinforced too in 
the lists of business-like section headings that begin each book and take us step by 
step through every stage of battle by directing us to the relevant set of anecdotes for 
each one.18 In comparison with the texts and literary traditions on which the 
Strategemata has drawn, Frontinus’ authorship seems (or is meant to seem) not only 
considerate to his readers but impressively rigorous. 
 This returns us to the image of Frontinus as a cutting-edge author that the 
preface began with. And if we wanted further proof that he is keen to establish 
himself as a big name in the world of military writing, we have only to turn to the 
start of the text proper, where Cato the Elder pops up as Frontinus’ first exemplum 
(Strat 1.1.1). We meet him in action, in his capacity as one of Rome’s most successful 
commanders; but he is also writing – albeit letters, designed to outwit any Spanish 
rebels, and not the texts for which Vegetius would later revere him. Nonetheless, his 
presence heading up the very first section of the Strategemata (leading us into battle 
as it were, if we want to pursue the text’s penchant for military metaphors) is 
significant. It signals to his readers that Frontinus knows what he is doing (who else 
should a Roman military writer worth his salt start with?), and that his text takes its 
inspiration first and foremost from the man credited with establishing Rome’s military 
writing tradition. However (as in the case of Frontinus’ self-positioning vis-à-vis the 
Greek strategemata tradition), it may also do more than that; for in returning Cato to 
the field of battle (rather than explicitly foregrounding his literary achievements, as 
Vegetius did), Frontinus may be subtly (even subconsciously) suggesting that he is a 
successor of Cato’s whose own writing on tactics could eclipse that of his eminent 
and learned predecessor. 
 
 
NON-TEXTUAL AUTHORITY AND UNSCIENTIFIC ‘EXPERTISE’ 
 
Cato’s characterisation in the opening exemplum of the Strategemata as a (literate) 
general, a doer not just an author, is interesting also because of the way in which it 
shifts the text’s emphasis from scientific rigour and book-learning (the themes that 
have dominated the preface – and that are foundational to so many other military 
treatises’ claims to authority) to less scholarly phenomena, such as native intelligence 
and practical reasoning. In fact, unscientific ‘expertise’ dominates the bulk of the text. 
For, having set himself up as an authority in the preface, Frontinus departs the arena 
and leaves it to the generals who populate each section to provide the instruction. And, 
far from drawing on any textual tradition, they rely on their wits. For all its literary-
scientific foundations, the Strategemata promises its readers illustrations of what 
commanders have done by ‘ingenious resourcefulness’ (that is the force of sollertia 
ducum facta); ‘for in this way future commanders will be surrounded by examples of 
both consilium (‘deliberation’ or ‘judgement’) and providentia (‘forethought’), and 
these will nurture their own ability to think up and execute similar deeds…’ (Strat. 1, 
pr. 1). 
                                                
18 On both the pragmatics and rhetoric of ‘tables of content’, see esp. Riggsby 2007 
(who, alas, overlooks Frontinus’ Strategemata in his discussion). 
 Take the first section of Book 1, which contains illustrations of the ways in 
which commanders have successfully concealed their plans. Here, as throughout the 
treatise, each exemplum begins with the name of the commander whose stratagem is 
being recorded, reinforcing the sense that it is they who are real authorities here, in 
both a military and a didactic sense. Their dominance of the narrative (as well as kick-
starting every exemplum, they are the subject of most of the main verbs) attests to 
their ascendancy on the field of battle; but it also establishes them not just as the 
tactical lessons to be learnt (the models to emulate) but as the readers’ teachers. They 
are the figures whose thoughts and voices we get to hear, judging, deciding, co-
ordinating and commanding; Frontinus, by contrast, almost never interjects to offer 
any commentary of his own (a feature we will come back to). His style of narrative 
does influence the way in which we react to them, however. For in example after 
example, we move rapidly from a commander thinking or wanting something to him 
acting and achieving it – with no reference, usually, to the episode’s wider context, or 
to any historical precedent or future repercussions for that matter. And this brevity 
and simplicity, the reductive economy with which Frontinus recounts each anecdote, 
repeatedly presents tactics as a matter of on-the-spot intuition, wisdom and decision.   
 At Strategemata 1.1.1, for example, we learn that Cato no sooner ‘reckoned’ 
(existimabat) that the Spanish cities that he had vanquished might rebel against him 
than he took steps to prevent them from doing so.19 He wrote to each, ordering them 
to destroy their fortifications, and threatening war unless they obeyed straightaway; 
and he ordered the letters to be delivered to all the cities on the same day. No details 
of the wider campaign are provided; we get only this compressed description of 
Cato’s concern and the stratagem that he came up with in response to it.20 Combative 
verbs abound as he switches from thinking to doing; and the brevity of clauses and 
rapid alternation between Cato’s actions (scripsit, minatus, iussit) and the activities 
that he demands of the Spanish cities and his envoys (diruerent, obtemperassent, 
reddi) conveys both the speed with which he will respond if his instructions are not 
quickly obeyed and his decisiveness in penning and dispatching them. The result 
(apparently) is instant. In reality, the co-ordination of their delivery would have 
delayed the letters’ arrival until those destined for the farthest cities had had time to 
reach their goal (as Appian pointed out, Hisp. 41). In this account, the letters are no 
sooner sealed and sent than they are received – and acted upon: ‘Each of the cities 
thought that the order had been for them alone; if they had known that the same 
message had been sent to all of them, a joint refusal would have been possible.’ 
Thanks to his foresight, and with a few strokes of his pen (and that of Frontinus), Cato 
has tricked every city in the region into swift capitulation. 
 And so it goes on. Again and again, over the course of four books, fifty sub-
sections, and nearly five hundred more or less formulaic exempla, commander after 
commander notices/realises/discovers/believes/fears (animadverto, sentio, intellego, 
compero, didico, vido, scio, credo, timeo, vereor); he quickly 
thinks/decides/plans/desires (arbitror, statuo, constituo, peto); and then he acts – and 
invariably succeeds with immediate effect. Occasionally the protagonists are whole 
nations (‘The Romans’, ‘The Athenians’, ‘The Thracians’21) or groups of 
                                                
19 Existimo is a verb which conveys some of the imprecision of mental reasoning, 
flagging up Cato’s agency in judging, deciding. 
20 Cf. Livy 34.17 and Appian, Hisp. 40-1, where we discover, e.g., the location of the 
cities in question, and learn more about Cato’s motivations.  
21 This is particularly true in a couple of sections of Book 3: e.g., Strat 3.15.1-3 and 5, 
3.13.1-2, and 3.18.1-3; also, e.g., 1.3.4; 3.17.1. 
commanders (‘certain Spartan generals’, ‘the survivors of the Varian disaster’22); and 
in Book 4 commanders sometimes collaborate with the Senate or consuls.23 For the 
most part, however, the exempla concern individuals who can take sole credit for their 
triumphs (at least as Frontinus narrates them). And it is their reasoning, judgement, 
common sense, use of logic, wisdom, intelligence, cleverness, resourcefulness, 
inventiveness and cunning that wins the day. As noted above, Frontinus’ authorial 
absence from the main body of the text means that he rarely comments explicitly on a 
stratagem or a commander; however, the vocabulary that he uses to characterise them 
in passing – consilium, sententia, prudentia, ratio, calliditas, sollertia – tells a 
consistent tale.   
There are exceptions. In a couple of anecdotes (1.10.1 and 4.7.6) we are told 
that a commander was prompted towards a particular stratagem by experience 
(experimentum). Another (2.3.7) employs veteran troops that had been ‘long trained’ 
(diu edocto) and were ‘practised’ (peritus) – one of the few references in the text to 
training/instruction (of troops, of course, not commanders). A few exempla later 
(2.3.15), Mark Antony has recourse to a technical manoeuvre (the testudo). These 
references to experience, training and specialist methods are unusual, however. In the 
preface to Book 3, Frontinus explicitly rules out discussion of technological 
operations (and with it, the need for any associated specialist learning) on the grounds 
that military engineering has nothing to contribute (any longer) to the formulation of 
stratagems. His commanders rarely base their schemes around set-piece manouevres 
and typically depart from, rather than follow, conventional practice. And though in 
one exemplum (2.6.10) the ‘hero’ (Pyrrhus) is the author not of a cunning deed but of 
a collection of ‘precepts on generalship’ (praecepta imperatoria) from which one 
specific stratagem is drawn, textbooks play no formative part in any of the stories that 
the Strategemata sets out.24 At no point do we ever see a commander reading a 
military manual – or any kind of commentary, or history, philosophy, or even epic, 
for that matter (just the odd letter, which invariably outwits them).25 Nor do we see 
one devising a plan by copying a precedent.26 Established procedures and principles 
pop up from time to time (often to be bypassed or adapted); but their input is drowned 
out by the volume of stories that showcase off-the-cuff, out-of-the-box, non-specialist, 
‘unscientific’ intelligence. As the bulk of the text post-preface presents them, military 
stratagems – and, by extension, generalship itself – have little to do with learning or 
indeed teaching; they rely on individual nous.   
 
 
BETWEEN SOLLERTIA AND SCIENTIA 
 
The scholarly, almost ‘scientific’ authority that Frontinus establishes around himself 
at the start of the Strategemata (and that is typical of many a military author) thus 
gives way to a very different kind of ‘expertise’ over the course of the text (one often 
celebrated in more historical texts) – if the innate ‘cleverness’ of lots of different 
generals can indeed be called ‘expertise’. In fact, that is one of the questions which 
                                                
22 Strat. 1.4.12 and 3.15.4; also, e.g., Strat. 3.13.3-5, although these exempla may be 
later interpolations. 
23 E.g., Strat. 4.1.18, 20, 24, 25, 28, 38. 
24 Pyrrhus’ Art of War is mentioned by Cicero (Ad. Fam. 9.25.1) and Polyaenus 
(6.6.3). 
25 Strat. 1.1.1; 1.4.13; cf 3.1.7-8. Cf. Vegetius, Epitoma 3.10.17-18 (discussed by 
Formisano in this volume). 
26 By contrast, exemplary figures in Valerius Maximus are sometimes described as 
imitating or learning from other exemplary material (Langlands 2008: 163, n. 14). 
the Strategemata raises. What does ‘expertise’ in the strategic context consist of – a 
high degree of prescribed, specialist knowledge, or a less disciplined, less fathomable 
and less acquirable kind of skill? Does the text endorse the shared authority of the 
scholarly tradition to which it claims to belong? Does it give more weight to a more 
solitary, intuitive kind of ‘know-how’ that does not arise out of that tradition? Or does 
it champion both – or neither? To put it another way, how do the text’s different 
authority figures – its erudite, systematising author and the hundreds of adroit but by 
and large unlearned generals to whom he entrusts the task of instructing his readers – 
relate to each other? Do the different models of expertise and authority that they 
embody work in partnership, in parallel, or in tension with one another?27  
Cleverness and cunning were identified as a crucial feature of successful 
generalship from Homer onwards, of course. Indeed, the ‘wiles’ of Odysseus have 
long been shorthand for the whole of the more cerebral side of war, the antithesis of 
plain might or simple valour. And many texts testify to a widespread assumption in 
Roman society in particular that generalship was more a matter of practice, character 
and innate ability (as well as social status) than scholarship or science. (It is that kind 
of assumption that Rycharde Morysine is also arguing against in the preface to his 
sixteenth century translation of the Strategemata quoted above.) In the pro Fonteio, 
for instance, Cicero hails the generals of former days (who represent an ideal whom 
today’s lesser men would do well to emulate) for their virtus (‘valour’), industria 
(‘energy’) and felicitas (‘good fortune’) in military matters, and states outright that 
these men, highly skilled in waging war, were not trained in any military science that 
came from books (non litteris homines ad rei militari scientiam…) but by their own 
deeds and successes (sed rebus gestis ac victoriis eruditos).28 Similarly, when 
celebrating Pompey’s extraordinary military prowess in his speech On Pompey’s 
Command, Cicero emphasises not only its practical (as opposed to theoretical) 
foundation (going into the army straight from school, Pompey could boast more 
encounters with the enemy than any other man; indeed, he had conducted more 
campaigns than other men have read of) but also its basis in that more elusive 
phenomenon, ability – and its natural consequence, success: ‘as a young man he 
became learned (erudita) in the science of war (ad scientiam rei militaris) not through 
other men’s prescriptions but through his own commands, not through the set-backs 
of battle but through victories, not through mere service but through triumphs.’29  
That is not the whole picture, of course; it was widely recognised that most 
generals acquired at least some of their know-how from sources external to their own 
experience. In Epistles 8.14.4-5, Pliny the Younger (a contemporary of Frontinus) 
looks nostalgically back to the time when it was the established custom for aspiring 
young commanders to learn from their elders (a practice now problematized, he 
claims, by the lack of virtus in all generations under Domitian): ‘It used to be the 
custom in days gone by that we would learn from infancy upwards from our elders, 
not only by listening but also by watching, and so acquire a sense of the things that 
we ourselves must do and pass them on in turn to our juniors. Thus young men were 
initiated into military service right away, so that they might get used to commanding 
                                                
27 Cf. Formisano in this volume, who identifies the tension between theory and 
practice as a recurring feature of the discourse of war, and one that has a habit of 
destabilizing the authority of texts.  
28 Pro Fonteio 42-3. On this and some of the following passages, see Campbell 1987: 
21-3. 
29 De Imp. Cn. Pomp. 28. See also, e.g. Pro Balbo 47, where Cicero implicitly 
contrasts’ Gaius Marius’ military know-how with a more theoretical kind of study; 
and Sall. Jug. 85 (discussed by Formisano in this volume). 
by obeying, and to leading by following.’30 In Tacitus’ Agricola (5), we see Agricola 
himself acquiring skill (ars), practice (usus) and ambition (stimulus) not only through 
his own early hands-on experiences but also by ‘learning from the skilful, and 
following the best’. And Cicero praises another general, Lucullus, not only for his 
‘talents’ but also for his ‘industry’ and ‘enthusiasm’, which led him – when posted to 
Asia to campaign against Mithridates – to spend the whole of his journey there 
‘questioning experts on the one hand and reading about past deeds on the other’. 
‘Thus he arrived in Asia as a finished commander, despite having been unversed in 
military matters when he set out.’31 The potential of book-learning was acknowledged, 
in other words, alongside other instructive forces. Indeed, if Vegetius is to be believed, 
that was the impetus behind Cato’s (practically inspired) De Re Militari.  
The reading that Lucullus does (like Cato’s writing) is essentially an extension 
of the oral tradition that Pliny romanticises – the kind of book-learning associated 
with historical texts and the exempla tradition (and with the education of the young by 
their seniors), not with theoretical or scientific works.32 Other authors promote the 
relevance of more specialist, systematising, even ‘technical’ texts, however; in fact it 
is clear that, although innate ability and practice were highly valued, they were often 
seen as something that could be combined with more formal learning. In a devastating 
critique of some Achaean generals, for instance, Polybius famously argues that ‘There 
are three routes available to those who want to acquire an understanding of the art of 
generalship: the first is the study of memoirs and the campaigns narrated in them; the 
second is the study of the systematic doctrines of experienced men; and the third is 
personal experience and practice. (The Achaean generals, he claims, were ignorant of 
all three.33) Xenophon’s earlier (mid-fourth century) Discourse on the Command of 
Cavalry certainly flirts with the idea that a military commander might learn his trade 
at least in part by following prescriptions set down in a treatise by an expert; although, 
at the same time as propounding some universal principles and even a degree of 
technical expertise, the text acknowledges the limitations of books and the relevance 
of both experience and ingenuity.34 At about the same time, in his only surviving 
treatise, How to Survive under Siege, Aeneas Tacticus weaves exempla together with 
a more ‘scientific’ approach by inviting readers to contemplate past practice (via lots 
of illustrative anecdotes) at the same time as establishing a canon of definitive 
methodologies and directing them to other treatises that he has written (e.g., 7.4; 8.2-
5; 21.1-2).  
From early on in the Greek military writing tradition, in other words, 
‘scientific’ learning, experience and nous were brought into (a shifting) dialogue with 
each other; and that trend was not restricted to ancient Greece. In the tenth book of 
Vitruvius’ treatise On Architecture, for example, a series of architects and engineers 
outwit various military commanders and win decisive victories for their own generals 
and countrymen by employing a mixture of scientia (precisely the kind of specialist, 
technical knowledge that Book 10 claims to transmit) and sollertia and consilia 
                                                
30 Pliny is romanticising the transmission of what might be termed ‘tacit knowledge’, 
‘things that cannot be articulated in a written form, and whose transmission requires 
socialisation with the expert, or with the expert community’ (Cuomo 2011: 327); this 
is different from the kind of intuitive, inborn ‘cleverness’ that the Strategemata’s 
generals tend to display. 
31 Cicero, Lucullus 1.1-2. 
32 On the likelihood that Cato’s military writing was part of his set of instructions 
destined for the education of his son, see Lenoir 1996: 84; also Astin 1978: 184-5. 
33 Polybius 11.8.1-2. 
34 See esp. the treatise’s closing section, 9.1-2; also 8.1-3, on technical expertise; 5.4, 
on experience; 5.1-3, 5.9-11, and 7.1, on ingenuity and ruses; cf. Memorabilia 3.3. 
(native cunning and shrewd judgement).35 As Serafina Cuomo has pointed out, when 
Vitruvius was writing the question ‘what makes a good military leader?’ (birth, virtue, 
experience, or/and specialized knowledge?) had become particularly urgent, 
following a rise in the prevalence and importance of technical expertise in recent 
conflicts, and we can see authors like Caesar grappling with it too.36 Eighty years later, 
the ideal general that emerges from Onasander’s Strategikos also represents a finely-
tuned balance of native qualities and acquired expertise. This text opens with a 
particularly forthright exposition of the principle that successful generalship depends 
at least in part on character (Strategikos 1-3). It returns time and again to the 
importance of both cleverness, intelligence (ἀγχινοία, γνώµη) and experience 
(ἐµπειρία).37 But it also toys with the possibility that collective strategic wisdom can 
be usefully systematised and handed on as a ‘science’; indeed, it attempts to distil 
from past practice (στρατηγήµατα – illustrative ‘strategems’) an overarching ‘theory 
of generalship’ (στρατηγικῆς δὲ περὶ θεωρία) that aims ‘to get at the art of the general 
and the wisdom that inheres in the precepts’ (Strat. pr. 3).38 Time and again, in other 
words, ancient texts (and many subsequent ones too, for that matter) present 
generalship as an endeavour that operates somewhere between sollertia and scientia. 
As the appeal of systematisation and rules competes with (or asserts itself into) the 
complex reality of warfare, native wit, collective experience and more scholarly 
approaches are seen to complement – and even be indispensible to – each other.39 
 
 
UNPICKING THEORIES IN STRATEGEMATA 1-3 
 
In theory, Frontinus’ Strategemata fits into and perpetuates that trend. Frontinus had 
almost certainly read and may well have been influenced by the likes of Xenophon, 
Aeneas Tacticus, Polybius, Vitruvius and Onasander, inter alia. Of course, we can 
only guess at the format and contents of his earlier De Re Militari; but his collection 
of ‘clever deeds of generals’, designed as it was (or so we are told) to supplement that 
earlier scientia, ought by its own reckoning to sustain the collaboration that other 
authors had long been mooting between unlearned strategic know-how/experience 
and more specialist, disciplined, ‘scientific’ learning. Perhaps the two texts did 
complement each other, in all sorts of ways that we will never know about. Even if 
they did, however, there is no getting away from the fact that some aspects of the 
Strategemata work against, in real tension with, the momentum of more systematising, 
‘scientific’ endeavours. In fact, in distilling sollertia ducum facta from both historical 
and more ‘technical’ sources and in rearranging them together (stripped of their 
contexts) into a new textual space, the Strategemata potentially unpicks the efforts of 
a huge range of texts – both scientific and un-scientific – to theorise and idealise 
about generalship. It raises questions about the authority of wider literary and 
                                                
35 De Arch.10.16, where one of the generals outwitted by this combination of scientia 
and sollertia is none other than Julius Caesar (König 2009: 49-50). 
36 Cuomo 2011: 323-6; on the increasing importance of technical skill, see also 
Cuomo 2007: 73. 
37 E.g., Strategikos Pr. 7; 21.3-4; 24; 32.9; 33; 42.10.  
38 On Onasander’s text, see esp. Formisano in this volume. 
39 Even Aelian’s highly technical Tactical Theory recommends combining precepts 
with practice (Tact. 21.2-3); see also 3.4, where he distinguishes between the ‘science’ 
set down by Aeneas Tacticus and the more hands-on kind of training (paideia) that 
Polybius appears to advocate. Formisano 2009: 228-30 offers a particularly succinct 
survey of ancient military writing, and its oscillation between technical theories and 
evocative exempla. 
intellectual traditions (like historiography and epic), in other words, not just military 
writing. And in the process, it challenges assumptions about the provenance, nature 
and status of individuals’ strategic expertise and authority.40 
 For, for all its superficial organisation, a destabilising sense of chaos emerges 
as one reads the Strategemata through. As I noted above, the text’s classification of 
exempla according to the various stages of conflict that a general might face makes an 
authoritative, rationalising impression. However, this organisation of material does 
not simply place like stories alongside each other in ways that illuminate particular 
strategic themes; it also juxtaposes anecdotes in various disorientating ways.41 For 
instance, we repeatedly see stratagems that proved successful in one encounter being 
overturned (or adapted and turned back on the enemy) a few exempla later. Similarly, 
victorious generals are frequently defeated by others in turn – sometimes by the very 
foe we had just seen them vanquish. This emerges particularly clearly in Frontinus’ 
presentation of Punic exempla: Scipio, Hannibal and a host of other Roman and 
Carthaginian commanders are frequently seen foiling or adapting each others’ 
stratagems in quick succession, in a disconcerting back-and-forth between victory and 
defeat. No matter how much know-how or sollertia they have at their finger-tips, the 
‘heroes’ of the text are always on the verge of being outmanoeuvred themselves, with 
luck often playing a part. It is not simply that reliable patterns and methodologies fail 
to emerge (and are even undermined) as one reads each section through; the anecdotes 
are interspersed with each other in ways which underline the profound 
unpredictability and uncontrollability of warfare. In the to-and-fro of battle (that 
emerges so powerfully from the to-ing and fro-ing each section does between Roman, 
Carthaginian, Spartan, Athenian, Sullan, Sertorian, Pompeian and Caesarian victories) 
even experience and on-the-spot ingenuity sometimes count for nothing – or emerge, 
at least, as having only ephemeral effects. Expertise of all kinds proves far from 
infallible, while generalship (it becomes clear) involves a good deal of chance.42  
 That message has obvious ramifications for a host of military treatises, 
particularly those with strong rationalising tendencies (many of which have a 
tendency to downplay the significance of chance and the unpredictability of warfare); 
but the internal dynamics of the Strategemata pose a challenge to other literary 
traditions too. The text’s constant back-and-forth between different time-periods 
dismantles familiar historical narratives, for instance. Exempla from Rome’s various 
conflicts with Carthage, for example, are scattered all over the text, with episodes 
from the first, second and third Punic wars even merging into each other in ways that 
frustrate attempts to identify progress, decline or any kind of periodization. Material 
that readers would normally encounter in historical works (as Frontinus himself points 
out in his introduction) is rearranged a-chronologically, according to military time – 
what happens when in a battle – in a way that foils many of the conventional and 
ideological interpretative moves readers are accustomed to make when trying to 
assess it. That is destabilising in a general way, but particularly so because such 
                                                
40 The arguments that follow are explored at greater length (and with more detailed 
discussion of illustrative passages of text) in my forthcoming book on Frontinus. They 
have something in common with Kronenberg’s approach in this volume to Varro’s 
ARD, in their openness to the possibility that Frontinus (like Varro) may be exposing 
to scrutiny – if not satirizing, precisely – some of the literary and scholarly traditions 
that his Strategemata supposedly derives from and contributes to. 
41 On the tendency of readers to search for order, coherence, themes and subtexts even 
in miscellanistic writing, see J. König 2007. 
42 Of course, Frontinus is not alone in acknowledging the role played by chance in – 
and the unpredictability of – warfare; the Strategemata is unusual, however, in 
foregrounding both so prominently. 
historical texts served both as an alternative and a complement to more technical 
military treatises. Thus both traditional sources of strategic instruction and inspiration 
– the historiographic and the scientific – are being challenged here.  
Even more disconcerting is the text’s failure to observe or preserve 
geographical, ethnic or cultural divisions. Many of the surviving military treatises that 
set out to explore or establish enduring military principles, especially those written 
under the Roman empire, combine that universalising project with one that asserts the 
distinctiveness of different nations. Onasander’s Strategikos, for instance, invites 
readers to reflect on Roman (in comparison with non-Roman) military models;43 and 
Frontinus’ near-contemporaries Aelianus Tacticus and Arrian (in his Ars Tactica, for 
example) both differentiate between Greek and Roman military methods (in different 
ways, and with different agenda).44 Of course, ethnic and cultural differences are a 
recurring (indeed, often a structuring) topos in ancient historiography too; in fact, 
questions about national identity (and the desire to define it) informed the 
composition and consumption of many ancient texts in a huge variety of genres.45 
Valerius Maximus’ decision to distinguish between his Roman and non-Roman 
exempla, in other words, would have seemed more conventional to ancient readers 
than Frontinus’ decision not to. For as well as jumping here, there and everywhere 
chronologically, Frontinus’ exempla are organised in a way that criss-crosses all over 
the Greek and Roman worlds. From time to time Frontinus identifies with Roman 
forces, referring to them as nos, or nostri; but the text does not promote national 
ideals or support Romano-centric historiography in the way that many others do.46 
Plenty of Roman stratagems arouse admiration, of course, and we see the borders of 
the empire being extended and defended. However, the to-and-fro of the text means 
that linear narratives of conquest and expansion give way to a more complex 
kaleidoscope of images that emphasises the frequent back and forth and convoluted 
inter-relations between Romans, Italians and other allies or subjects. Additionally, 
interspersed with exempla from inter-state conflicts is a significant number of 
anecdotes from Rome’s various civil wars – another way in which Frontinus’ text 
differs from that of Valerius Maximus, who explicitly eschews reference to civil strife 
(3.3.2).  
Many of the macro-narratives that we are familiar with about Athens, Sparta, 
Persia, Thebes, Macedon, and so on, are similarly broken up by the text’s constant 
oscillation (within individual sections and across the collection as a whole) between 
different theatres of war; and also by the way in which that oscillation underlines the 
multi-national dimension of many conflicts (and nations’ histories). We repeatedly 
see Spartans, Gauls, Macedonians, Iberians and so on fighting on different fronts, 
with different allies and enemies, in exempla that are juxtaposed with each other. And 
                                                
43 Strat. pr. 3-4, where he claims that ‘we shall consider above all the valour of the 
Romans’. Cf. Ambaglio 1981: 362-5, who argues that Onasander promotes 
specifically Greek principles and exempla to his Roman readers in order to establish 
the ongoing significance of Greece in Rome; and Formisano 2011: 45, who notes the 
lack of references to Roman history. 
44 Stadter 1978: 41-5; Bosworth (1993). 
45 As Harries notes in this volume, an emphasis on the Greekness or Romanness of a 
particular body of knowledge was often deployed in specialist texts to enhance the 
authority of the expertise they promised to share.  
46 Cf., e.g., Valerius Maximus (2.7.pref.), who identifies military discipline as largely 
the prerogative of his own race, ‘the chief glory and mainstay of the Roman empire’ 
no less. Overall Roman exempla slightly out-number non-Roman ones (see Campbell 
1987: 15, n.11 for the figures), but (as Gallia 2012: 197, n. 56 points out) ‘…the 
clever stratagems of Roman generals make up only 56 percent of the total.’ 
the parallels and paradoxes that emerge from these jumps and juxtapositions, as 
different histories are brought into proximity with each other, expose history itself as 
a bewildering tangle of unpredictable oscillations between different peoples. In 
excerpting episodes from a huge variety of texts, in other words, and in rearranging 
them alongside other thematically related anecdotes from different times and places, 
the Strategemata does not simply criss-cross but somehow erodes (or exposes as 
inherently unstable) political and cultural boundaries. It teaches us that stratagems and 
successful generalship are not the preserve of one particular race more than any other; 
and in so doing, it also unpicks many other stories that are conventionally told about 
the Mediterranean past, obscuring rather than reinforcing a host of ideas that have 
built up about national distinctions and identities. Thus it is not simply histories that 
are deconstructed here; fundamental aspects of foundation myths and national 
ideologies – the stuff of epic even – have their authority challenged; some of the very 
narratives, indeed, that often contribute to the construction of an individual general’s 
or nation’s strategic authority.  
This may not be intentional; indeed, it is (in part, at least) an inevitable 
consequence of the excerpting process, what often happens when material is lifted 
from lots of different sources and arranged together according to new criteria 
(although Valerius Maximus offers a telling counter-example of a compilatory text 
that operates rather differently, as does Polyaenus’ later Strategemata, which groups 
stratagems chronologically and geographically). Even so, the effect is disorienting – 
as is Frontinus’ authorial absence. There are a few rare occasions when Frontinus 
slips in the odd word of personal analysis. He might note that a stratagem was carried 
out ita perite (‘with such skill’), for instance (3.13.6), or he might identify a general’s 
‘steadfastness’ or the ‘imprudence’ of certain troops as significant (e.g., 2.7.11 and 12, 
where we see the ghost of some authorial interpretation). For the most part however, 
he almost never intrudes to offer any guiding commentary – despite his own 
significant strategic experience, reference to which would have lent his voice extra 
authority. While Valerius Maximus’ regular expressions of approbation, 
condemnation, exclamation and exhortation steer his readers towards particular 
interpretations, Frontinus suppresses the author’s analytical, expert potential, leaving 
his material to speak for itself and his readers to identify what connections or themes 
they will.47  
Of course, much of Valerius Maximus’ assertive interpretation is focused 
around his interest in exploring right and wrong, virtue and vice. Ethics are 
foregrounded in Onasander’s Strategikos, too, as something that should guide a 
general in his military decisions and activities (and lend him a different kind of 
authority alongside his strategic expertise). In fact, many ancient discussions of 
warfare and generalship touch on ethical issues, be they historical, philosophical or 
more ‘technical’ accounts.48 Though many before him had acknowledged that 
stratagems especially were often morally debatable,49 this is not an angle we are 
encouraged to pursue in Frontinus’ Strategemata, however. Unlike Valerius, 
Frontinus tends to avoid morally emotive vocabulary like dolus (trick), fallacia 
                                                
47 As Langlands 2008: 162, n.10 notes, authorial comment does not necessarily limit 
the potential multi-valence of exempla; lack of authorial comment, on the other hand, 
further enhances their ‘undecidability’ (Lyons 1989: 8-15).   
48 E.g., Thuc. 1.71-9 and 3.36-49; Plato, Alcibiades 1, 107c-109d; Plato Rep. 5.470c-
1c; Plato, Laws 1.628c-e; Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics 3.5-9 (1115a3-17b23); 
Aristotle Politics 7.2 (1324b2-5a10); Polybius 18.14-15 and 35-7; Cicero De Off. 
1.34-41 and 61-68; Virgil, Aen. 12.919-52. See also Most 2011 on justice and war in 
Hesiod.  
49 Esp. Val. Max. 7.4; cf. Wheeler 1998: 2-18; 21; 109. 
(deceit) and vafritias (craftiness), preferring the more intellectual language of 
consilium or ratio even above words like sollertia and calliditas when describing the 
thought-processes of his generals. His lack authorial commentary also means that 
accounts of the clever use of terrain or the deft way in which a lack of resources was 
overcome are narrated with the same compressed neutrality as, for instance, an 
episode in which Roman soldiers are induced to gorge on raw meet so that they may 
be attacked later that night while struggling to digest it (2.5.13).50 Very occasionally a 
character from within an anecdote questions the ethics of a commander’s behaviour 
(at 3.12.2, 3.11.1 and 2.5.41, for instance); however, rather than pursuing or endorsing 
their protest, the text focuses on (and holds up for approbation) the end result of the 
stratagem, not its morality.51 Ethics are thus subordinated to tactics, as virtuous and 
unscrupulous commanders triumph alike. Of course, this is the reality of many a 
history; but in the case of the Strategemata, which presents these exempla as 
authoritative models for readers to imitate, it may be a little more disconcerting – not 
least because they would be used to, or aware of, other military manuals that are more 
ethically judgemental or prescriptive. It is not simply that ethics are overlooked or 
subordinated, in other words; readers of the Strategemata are invited to contemplate 
acting unethically from time to time themselves (that is, to dispense with some of the 
moral parameters that, in dialogue with other social, cultural and political discourses, 
often boosted a general’s wider authority, at least in retrospect), as the text prompts 
them to visualise themselves not just as another Alexander, or another Scipio, or Cato, 
but as another Tarquinius Superbus, or another Iphicrates, or Coriolanus.52 More than 
that, they are (once again) prompted to reflect on the habits and validity of 
historiographic traditions that have long been valued for their didactic potential.  
The variety of people whom the Strategemata suggests readers might emulate 
is potentially disconcerting in other ways too. No distinctions are drawn between 
kings and slaves, consuls and rebels, emperors and bandits, magistrates and 
mercenaries, and in a couple of exempla women show themselves as capable as men 
when it comes to devising stratagems. Perhaps more significantly, non-experts and 
one-day-wonders triumph alongside experienced or virtuoso generals, and 
occasionally even overthrow them. This macro-trend brings us back to the impression 
that emerges out of individual exempla: that learning and training are less likely to 
determine a commander’s chance of success than the wits he was born with and his 
on-the-spot ‘cleverness’. But as the present section has shown, that impression is only 
one of the ways in which the Stratagemata undermines the authority of some of the 
more systematising, theorising, idealising texts and literary traditions that touch on 
warfare or generalship and shape ideas about what it is that can make a general seem 
particularly authoritative (in his own day, and beyond it). For en masse, and through 
their organisation and presentation as well as their selection, Frontinus’ exempla 
unpick historical, epic and philosophical narratives about political periods, national 
identities and behavioural boundaries that so often feed into (and are in turn 
sometimes influenced by) the narrower literary-theoretical tradition that the 
                                                
50 Compare also Valerius Maximus’ criticism of Carthaginian deceit (at, e.g., 
7.4.ext.2) with Frontinus’ authorial detachment at 2.2.7 (where Hannibal’s positioning 
of his troops so that the Romans are troubled by wind and dust, far from being 
deplored, is set alongside exempla in which Romans and Thebans deploy the same 
trick – 2.2.8 and 12 – undermining the distinction that Valerius tries to draw between 
Roman and non-Roman behaviour). 
51 See also e.g. 2.11.5-7; and Wood 1967: 247 on this feature. 
52 Le Saux 2004: 99 notes earlier readers’ anxiety about this feature of the 
Strategemata; cf. Livy (1 pref. 10) and Valerius Maximus, who present exempla for 
both imitation and avoidance. 
Strategemata claims to be part of: the ‘drawing up’ of a transferable ‘science’ of 
generalship. All strands of military writing (not just the technical tradition) are 
exposed to scrutiny here. 
 
 
FROM READING TO DOING 
 
As Marco Formisano has pointed out, we do not need to wait until the 
nineteenth century to find examples of military treatises that reflect as much on the 
‘essence’ of war as they do on how to wage it; indeed, a number of ancient texts could 
be said to fall into that category.53 The Strategemata, I suggest, is one of them: 
whether intentionally or not, its collation and presentation of strategic exempla across 
all four books teaches us as much about the chaotic nature of battle as what 
stratagems or strategy a general might adopt to try to control it.54 In so doing, 
however, it also prompts reflection on some of the wider literary movements that it 
draws on and engages with – especially the systematising, ‘scientific’ side of the 
military writing tradition. Through the military precision of their internal organisation, 
Books 1-3 appear to distil history into a comprehensive set of instructive illustrations 
for every strategic eventuality. And yet the volume, variety and disorienting to-and-
fro of the exempla within each sub-section combines with an emphasis on on-the-spot 
intuition, intelligence and native wisdom (rather than learning, training or experience) 
to frustrate attempts that we might make to relate them to – let alone derive from them 
– any coherent, definitive, idealising or self-promoting theory of tactics or generalship. 
Then Book 4 is tacked on, and sections 4.1-6 – which organise their exempla into 
moral categories such as ‘On Discipline’, ‘On Justice’ and ‘On Steadfastness’ – try 
out a different methodological approach that brings us closer to a more prescriptive, 
theorising (and indeed ethically-oriented) kind of treatise, at the same time as moving 
us further away from the idea that such a treatise could ever be conclusive or 
completely convincing. (Book 4, after all, is presented as a supplementary 
afterthought to an already supplementary text, part of an on-going expansion of 
Frontinus’ original literary project.55). Finally, section 4.7 (de variis consiliis) steers 
us away from virtues and back to ‘sundry’ examples of consilium (Frontinus’ 
favourite synonym for sollertia, strategic ‘cleverness’ or ‘cunning’). Intuition, 
intelligence and native wisdom (those potent but elusive qualities) take centre stage 
again, but in a miscellany of exempla that return us to many of the themes treated in 
Books 1-3 and emphasises more than ever the bewilderingly infinite array of 
situations that any general may face, and the near impossibility of employing even 
well-established strategic approaches in predictable ways.56 
                                                
53 Formisano 2011: 40-1. 
54 The authorship of Strat. 4 was questioned in the nineteenth century (Wachsmuth 
1860; Wölfflin 1875); but Bendz 1938 argued in favour of identifying Frontinus as its 
author, and has since been followed by the majority of commentators (e.g., Goodyear 
1982; Campbell 1987: 15; Wheeler 1988: 20; Campbell & Purcell 1996: 785; Turner 
2007: 432; Gallia 2012: 204; Malloch 2015). 
55 Strat. 4 pr. distinguishes between Book 4 and the rest of the treatise, and stresses 
the potential incompleteness of the author’s efforts: ‘…I shall now set out in this book 
examples that did not seem to come under quite the same category as those in the 
earlier books…, namely examples rather of generalship than stratagems – as a way of 
completing the project of the three earlier books (if indeed I have completed them).’ 
56 In this breakdown of categories and textual organisation, Frontinus may even be 
satirizing attempts by other writers to systematize military know-how successfully. 
The very last exemplum in the book encapsulates that lesson in 
unpredictability beautifully. Quintus Metellus, the ‘hero’ of the tale, is in Spain, about 
to break camp; and in order to keep his troops in line, he deceives them, telling them 
that he has discovered that ambushes have been laid by the enemy. We are told that he 
did this ex disciplina – ‘to maintain discipline’; but, by chance (forte), they then did 
meet with an ambush, and because the soldiers were prepared for one they were 
unafraid. In being unexpectedly providential, Metellus’ approach advocates the 
strategic advantages of disciplina (something often promoted in technical, historical, 
ethical and epic descriptions of generalship); but it also reminds readers of the 
accidental, unforeseeable, uncontrollable forces of war, and of the chance that is 
involved in strategic success (or failure). In that sense, 4.7.42 offers a compelling 
conclusion to the Strategemata, in so far as it alerts readers one final time to a 
message that the entire collection has been building towards (right from Frontinus’ 
very first preface): that, no matter how many supplementary bits are added, no text, 
not even one as expansive as the Strategemata, can hope to offer complete closure on 
or be definitively authoritative about tactics or generalship, because in war the 
unexpected will always happen.57 As well as completing and complementing his 
earlier scientia rei militaris, in other words (for instance, by reinforcing disciplina as 
a principle), this vast and destabilising collection of sollertia ducum facta threatens to 
undermine it – and the authority of many other prescriptive, theorising, idealising or 
romanticising discussions of generalship and warfare – by making it clear how many 
endless permutations of strategic cleverness there are (and must be) because war itself 
presents an infinite variety of challenges.58 
That is not to say that the Strategemata does not teach its readers how to think 
up stratagems or operate as a general. (In arguing this, I should stress, I am not 
suggesting that the Strategemata’s readers were all or exclusively interested in 
learning the hands-on practicalities of generalship. Many would have been reading 
with broader intellectual agenda – to inquire into the nature of military strategy, 
perhaps, or the history of generalship. Because the text casts all of its readers in the 
role of aspiring generals, however, we are all invited to consider what practical 
lessons we potentially learn from it, whatever our other agenda.) In fact, it is 
profoundly instructive even as it exposes its own limitations and those of the wider 
military writing tradition – precisely because it confronts readers with the fact that 
they can never hope to acquire an exhaustive set of easy-to-implement prescriptions 
and forces them into a different model of learning from the one that so many other 
texts default to (whereby an expert passes on general precepts to the uninitiated). At 
first glance, it might look as if Frontinus establishes a very simple relationship 
between his text (and the know-how that it embodies) and his readers (and the know-
how that they supposedly aspire to): one that sets the Strategemata up as a direct 
conduit of strategic expertise between former and future commanders and implies a 
single step between reading about successful stratagems and performing some 
oneself.59 The language that he uses, however, to characterise that relationship in the 
preface to Book 1 reveals that it is rather more complex than that, and that reading 
does not necessarily translate immediately or straightforwardly into an ability to do. 
This is what he says, after he has explained his reasons for writing the Strategemata: 
                                                
57 Smith 1998: 163, n. 52 is thus wrong to suggest that Book 4 ‘tails off limply’. 
58 This takes one step further a disclaimer often made in ‘technical’, ‘scientific’ or 
encyclopaedic texts, that they cannot hope to be fully comprehensive. Cf. Doody’s 
suggestion in this volume that Varro’s De Re Rustica is another text which questions 
the authority/efficacy of writing when it comes to learning about agriculture. 
59 This is how many read it; e.g. Gallia 2012: 193. 
‘Future generals will thus be surrounded [or ‘girded up’ – succincti] by 
examples of wisdom and foresight, which will nurture (nutriatur) their 
own ability to think up (excogitandi) and generate (generandi) ‘similar 
deeds’ (similia). It will also follow that a general need not be nervous 
about the outcome of his own inventiveness (inventionis suae), because he 
will be able to compare it with experiments that have already been tried 
out.’ (Strat. 1. pr.1) 
This is explicitly nourishing, supportive language – indeed, the kind of language that 
might characterise a commander’s relationship to his troops, for succingo can be used 
for ‘equipping’ an army. On one level, then, Frontinus as author (or commander in 
chief) is supplying his readers (or generals) with the ‘equipment’ they need to succeed 
as military leaders. However, the emphasis on ‘thinking up’, ‘generating’ and 
‘inventiveness’ also puts the onus on them not merely to copy but to come up with 
similarly successful stratagems of their own devising – and that inserts another, far 
more challenging step into the process. It is not simply a case of taking up the 
proffered ‘equipment’ that the text offers, in other words, and putting it into practice. 
The Strategemata demands something more from aspiring generals/readers, 
something whose difficulty (as we have seen) the text itself underlines. For, although 
the vast litany of ‘clever’ commanders that the Strategemata parades before our eyes 
reminds us that a huge variety of people in the past have been successful strategists – 
and dangles the prospect of further ‘like deeds’ (similia) tantalisingly in front of us – 
its emphasis on the role played by both chance and native, on-the-spot, unlearned 
‘cleverness’ makes the likelihood of achieving any comparable strategic triumphs of 
our own look dauntingly remote, even with a handbook to ‘help’ us. 
We need not despair, however. The verb succingo can mean to ‘hem in’, or 
even ‘besiege’, of course, as well as to ‘surround’ or ‘equip’, and that is fitting 
because in a sense that is what the Strategemata does to its reader. It transports us to 
lots of tricky battlefield scenarios, and instead of offering us hard-and-fast rules it 
encircles (one might almost say ambushes) us again and again with an array of 
strategic exempla that undercut many of our assumptions about the foundations of 
generalship. And yet that process is itself didactic in quite a sophisticated way: for 
instead of offering us prescriptions in the manner of many ‘technical’ treatises, 
Frontinus gives his readers an experience of the on-the-spot processes of decision-
making in unpredictable circumstances that a successful general needs to be expert in. 
In plunging us into these situations (which take us steadily through the different 
stages of battle) and surrounding us with so many different (and differently valid, 
sometimes controversial) strategic options, the text gives us the opportunity to hone 
our skills of generalship (or observe the nature of it) – to confront the difficulty of 
decision-making and to practice exercising our judgement, drawing on our nous and 
being inventive in conditions which are constantly shifting – rather than just offering 
a set of exempla that can be straightforwardly imitated.60 That is similar to the way in 
which Rebecca Langlands has suggested Valerius Maximus’ collection teaches us 
ethics;61 but it also takes us back to a long-established and much romanticised non-
textual tradition of learning about generalship that I mentioned above, the kind that 
                                                
60 Cf. Wood 1967: 246-8. 
61 On this, see esp. Langlands 2008, who draws attention to the interaction between 
strings of exempla in Valerius Maximus (which expose ethical complexity, not 
clarity) and argues (160) that Valerius’ arrangement of ethical exempla ‘is designed to 
tell Roman readers not simply what to think but how to think ethically, enabling 
Roman readers both to explore the scope of these moral categories and to develop 
their skills of moral reasoning.’ See also Langlands 2011: 23; J. König 2007 on 
Plutarch’s Sympotic Questions; and Rimell 2007 on Petronius’ Satyricon. 
Cicero talks about in his text On Pompey’s Command, where commanders learn about 
generalship by commanding (victoriously). 
The Strategemata, then, is not so much a nourishing as a challenging text – 
but that is what makes it instructive, in all sorts of respects. As we have seen, it brings 
different manifestations of ‘expertise’ (systematising, ‘scientific’ authors, and 
intuitive, unlearned but triumphant former generals) not only into collaboration but 
into tension with each other. In so doing, it raises questions not just about what 
authorial and strategic expertise respectively consist of but also about the authority of 
a whole range of texts which depict generalship, both within and beyond the military 
writing tradition (historical, philosophical, and even epic, as well as ‘technical’ 
works). In fact, its overlaps and engagement with non-technical as well as more 
‘scientific’ texts draw attention to the shifting identity of (especially Latin) military 
writing and to its lack of consistency as a genre.62 More than that, in exposing the 
limitations of all such texts (itself included) to communicate reliably or conclusively 
about the nature of generalship, it prompts reflection (not necessarily consciously) on 
the relationship between writing, reading and doing – on the interplay between texts 
and the world that they aim/claim to reflect and influence. The Strategemata draws 
attention to a gap, on the one hand, between words and deeds – between the Art of 
Generalship as an intellectual, textual discipline and the act of generalship as practical 
phenomenon. At the same time, however, the didactic method that it adopts (that is 
reminiscent of some non-textual approaches to teaching and/or learning) goes some 
way towards bridging that gap, by providing a textual space in which its readers may 
absorb and even practice the very skills that could enable their or others’ future deeds 
to go down in history (books) as successful strategic exempla. A treatise that 
overturns assumptions about authorial expertise and textual authority, in other words, 
ultimately proves itself expert and authoritative in instructing its readers – on a 
number of different levels: practical, theoretical and ideological – in the elusive ‘art’ 
of generalship.  
 
 
AUTHORS, GENERALS AND EMPERORS 
 
The relationship between writing and doing brings us back one final time to 
the authorial persona that Frontinus adopts in the Strategemata, which is strikingly 
different from the one he employs in a later, Nervan treatise, the De Aquis. In that text, 
Frontinus is a dominant and indeed exemplary presence: from its preface, where he 
parades his proximity to the emperor Nerva; through catalogue after catalogue of facts 
and figures (in which autopsy and Frontinus’ personal interventions are repeatedly 
flagged); to the closing section, where the weight of the expertise and authority that 
he has accrued over the course of the text (both through its preparation and its 
publication) gives him the power to adjudicate on the emperor’s behalf, as his 
representative not just his right-hand-man.63 Doing and writing come together to 
reinforce each other in lots of ways in that treatise. In the Strategemata, by contrast, 
Frontinus absents himself from the bulk of the text, as we have seen, handing the 
limelight over to his vast collection of exemplary commanders and rarely intruding 
with any commentary of his own. Perhaps the most striking aspect of his authorial 
self-effacement is the fact that this experienced commander (whose text revolves 
around the didactic potential of experienced commanders) makes almost no reference 
                                                
62 Lenoir 1996: 85 and Formisano 2011: 42 both note a lack of continuity between the 
surviving Latin military treatises. 
63 König 2007. 
to his own experiences as a commander.64 For Frontinus was an actor not just an 
author in the military sphere (indeed, in addition to his involvement in at least one 
German campaign, Frontinus had served as Governor of Britain just before Agricola 
and succeeded in subduing parts of Wales during his tenureship65). In Book 4 we find 
one exemplum which discusses a campaign that Frontinus was involved in (4.3.14 – 
and that anecdote deserves a whole chapter to itself). Aside from that there is no clear 
reference anywhere else in the text to any stratagems for which Frontinus was 
responsible. This failure to refer to his own strategic experiences is surprising 
particularly because there was a widely held assumption in many strands of ancient 
technical and scientific writing, not least in the military writing tradition itself, that an 
author’s personal experience could lend his writing an extra layer of authority. That, 
after all, is one of the things that makes Cato an authoritative military writer.66  
Of course, Frontinus may have referred to his own military experiences more 
in his lost De Re Militari. But there may also be a number of social and political 
explanations for his failure to bring his practical expertise and ‘scientific’/scholarly 
authority into greater dialogue with each other in the Strategemata.67 His textual self-
presentation may have been closely linked to his public status, for instance. It is 
perhaps no surprise that he promoted himself and his activities so boldly in the De 
Aquis, for by then he had become a triple consul and one of Rome’s most influential 
statesmen; moreover, he was writing from the heart of – almost as a spokesman for – 
the imperial government. When he wrote the Strategemata (under Domitian) he had a 
lower public profile and was writing in a private capacity; and the persona that he 
adopts in that text may have been crafted in part to be commensurate with that: 
modest (as far as hands-on experience went), to suit a relatively modest CV. It was 
also the case, of course, that authors constructed and paraded authority and expertise 
somewhat differently under different emperors. Arguably, Frontinus’ reticence in 
putting himself forward as an exemplum (not just a scholar) in the Domitianic text had 
something to do with the political context in which he was writing – just as his 
assertiveness in the De Aquis exploited the Nervan-Trajanic regime’s supposedly 
more liberal atmosphere.68 The currency of doing/experience versus writing/learning 
– and the kind of authority that an author might derive from each – fluctuated in 
response to many factors.  
By way of conclusion, it is worth considering the other side of that coin too: 
the ways in which textual images and ideas of authority and expertise shaped wider 
discourses. For Frontinus’ presentation of generalship and interrogation of different 
kinds of authority and expertise within the Strategemata had implications, potentially, 
for Domitian and the principate itself, raising all sorts of questions about both. For 
instance, how did the Strategemata’s characterisation of generalship as an activity 
that almost anyone could turn their hand to but also something that was tantalisingly 
difficult to guarantee any success in (because native wit and chance were of more 
significance than learning or virtue) fit – or conflict? – with Domitian’s attempts to 
                                                
64 Cf. Varro in the De Re Rustica, who (according to Doody in this volume) steps 
back from claims he makes in the prefaces about the extent and authority of his 
practical experience/know-how. Cf. also the preface to Onasander’s Strategikos (and 
Formisano in this volume), where the value of authorial experience is debated. 
65 Tac. Ag. 17. 
66 See also, e.g., Polybius 12.25g; and Marius’ speech in Sallust, BJ 85.12. On the use 
of the first person (and indeed the second-person) in technical/scientific texts, see esp. 
Hine 2009; also Nutton 2009. 
67 This is a topic I pursue in my forthcoming book. 
68 Compare Turner 2007 and Malloch 2015 on the politics of Frontinus’ self-
presentation in the Strategemata. 
inflate his own military expertise and so further cement his imperial authority? Might 
the unpredictable to-and-fro of victory between a host of Roman and non-Roman 
imperatores have reminded readers how unexpected, short-lived and unstable 
command could be, and how brutal the process was when it was challenged? (For 
Domitian and his contemporaries – whose memories of the conflicts and chaos of AD 
68-9 would still have been fresh, and whose anxieties about the future were equally 
pressing – that would naturally have been a destabilising message, one reinforced 
perhaps by the volume of civil war exempla in the text.) And what might the text’s 
rejection of authoritative (indeed authorising) epic teleologies and moral 
fundamentals have done to the image and authority of the Roman empire?  
Such political questions are not the only ones we might ask; but it is fitting to 
end by gesturing towards the wider context in which the Strategemata was written. 
For constructions and expressions of expertise and authority within individual 
disciplines always intersect with constructions and expressions of expertise and 
authority in other spheres of activity (literary, cultural, social and political), in 
thought-provoking and sometimes challenging ways.  
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